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The Pacific Alliance and Its Effect on Latin 
America: 
Must a Continental Divide be the Cost of a 
Pacific Alliance Success? 
CHRISTINE DANIELS1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the calls of Simón Bolívar in the nineteenth century to 
unite the newly independent countries of Latin America into one power-
ful nation, there has been a desire to work together to achieve economic 
and social success. As the twentieth century unfolded, so did a series of 
attempts to unite Latin American countries through regional trade 
agreements. Groups such as the Andean Community in the late 1960s, 
and later the Bolivarian Alliance of the Peoples of Our America 
(ALBA, by its initials in Spanish) in the early 2000s, have managed to 
find common ground in ideological principles. Mercosur was estab-
lished in 1991 as an organization to achieve free trade, but over time, it 
has become more politicized, especially with the inclusion of Venezuela 
in 2012. 
The Pacific Alliance, launched in 2011, has focused its energies 
upon advancing trade and integration while maintaining that the asso-
ciation is strictly apolitical—a first in Latin America. This note argues 
that while the Pacific Alliance will bring success to its member coun-
tries, this same success will divide Latin American nations. The division 
will in turn cause decreased trade amongst the nations and the region 
will lose the opportunity to engage in complementary growth. In order 
to mitigate these negative effects, the Pacific Alliance should make ef-
forts to maintain enduring and meaningful relations with the rest of Lat-
in America. On the eve of its possible expansion, it is essential however, 
 
 1. Christine Daniels is a student at Loyola Law School, class of 2015. Her interest in this 
topic began in her undergraduate studies at UCLA where she majored in International Economics 
with a focus on Latin America. She especially thanks Professor Carlos Berdejo, of Loyola Law 
School, for his invaluable help. 
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that the Pacific Alliance maintain its focus on trade liberalization and 
not become another refuge for politically like-minded countries. 
Part II explains the different levels of integration offered by trade 
agreements and provides a brief history of regionalism in South Ameri-
ca. In order to predict the future of the Pacific Alliance, the structure 
must be evaluated and the past must be contextualized. Part III presents 
the first argument of the paper, mainly that the Pacific Alliance will 
bring success to its member nations. The three factors required for a 
successful regional trade agreement are: common national characteris-
tics, policies that foster long-run economic growth, and the establish-
ment of both a supranational entity and an effective dispute resolution 
system. Part IV predicts what effect the Pacific Alliance success will 
have on the rest of Latin America. Part V gives recommendations that 
the Pacific Alliance can apply to promote continental harmony while, at 
the same time, maintain its focus on pragmatic free trade rather than 
idealistic political aspirations.  Lastly, Part VI summarizes the analysis 
of this paper and offers conclusions about the Pacific Alliance’s future 
role in Latin America. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Theoretical Framework: Trade Agreement Basics 
Multilateralism and regionalism are two general approaches for a 
nation to achieve trade liberalization, that is, to expand its markets of 
goods and services beyond its own borders.2 The goal of multilateralism 
is to establish an inclusive free trade in which all nations can partici-
pate.3 The World Trade Organization (WTO) is a prime example of 
multilateralism. Beginning in 1947 with the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) amongst twenty-three countries,4 the WTO has 
expanded to 160 member nations as of March 2, 2013.5 The goal of re-
gionalism, on the other hand, is to establish a preferential trade ar-
 
 2. Stephen Joseph Powell & Trisha Low, Beyond Labor Rights: Which Core Human Rights 
Must Regional Trade Agreements Protect?, 12 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 91, 94 (2012) [herein-
after Powell & Low]. 
 3. Jagdish Bhagwati, Regionalism and Multilateralism: An Overview, in NEW DIMENSIONS 
IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION 22, 24 (Jaime De Melo & Arvind Panagariya eds., 1993). 
 4. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, WORLD TRADE REPORT 2011: THE WTO AND 
PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT: FROM COEXISTENCE TO COHERENCE 46 (2011), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/world_trade_report11_e.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2013) [hereinafter WORLD TRADE REPORT 2011]. 
 5. Understanding the WTO: The Organization: Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 
2013).  
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rangement among a specific group of nations.6 The ever-growing num-
ber of regional trade agreements7 demonstrates that regionalism is the 
preferred way to propel economic growth.8 Indeed, regionalism is wide-
ly perceived by many countries as a faster means of obtaining a deeper 
level of trade integration than the broader multilateralism approach.9 
Within the regionalism approach, there are different levels of eco-
nomic integration in which two or more nations can participate. These 
levels are listed in the order of least to most economic integration: pref-
erential trade agreement,10 free trade area, customs union, economic un-
ion and complete economic integration.11 A preferential trade agreement 
occurs when member nations agree to reduce tariffs on a limited number 
of products.12 When member nations agree to eliminate tariffs entirely, 
but each nation is still free to maintain its own trade restrictions towards 
nonmembers, a free trade area exists.13 The following levels build upon 
the previously mentioned level. A customs union adds to a free-trade 
area by requiring that all member nations have a uniform tariff with 
nonmembers (also known as a common external tariff).14 A common 
market expands a customs union by terminating any restrictions on the 
movement of the factors of production—labor, capital, and services—
among member nations.15 Next, a coordination of macroeconomic poli-
cies is added to a common market in order to establish an economic un-
ion. A principal example of this would be the European Union, where 
member countries unified their currency when the Euro was estab-
lished.16 The most cohesive level is complete economic integration,17 
which requires the unification of “monetary, fiscal and social” policies, 
a task made possible by implementing a powerful supranational entity.18 
 
 6. Bhagwati, supra note 3, at 22. 
 7. Regional Trade Agreements, WORLD TRADE ORG., 
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (“Regional 
trade agreements (RTAs) have become increasingly prevalent since the early 1990s.” The number 
of regional trade agreements reported to the WTO by its members is over 575 as of July 2013, 
379 of which were still in force.).  
 8. Powell & Low, supra note 2, at 94-95. 
 9. WORLD TRADE REPORT 2011, supra note 4, at 51. 
 10. Zhenis Kembayev, Integration Processes in South America and in the Post-Soviet Area: 
A Comparative Analysis, 12 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 25, 27 (2005). 
 11. BELA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 2 (Routledge 2011) (1961). 
 12. Kembayev, supra note 10, at 27. 
 13. BALASSA, supra note 11, at 2. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Kembayev, supra note 10, at 28.   
 16. Id. 
 17. Complete economic integration is also known as a political union. Id. 
 18. BALASSA, supra note 11, at 2. 
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At this point, a federal state is created.19 
B. Brief History of Regionalism in South America 
South American nations prove to be no exception to the general 
preference of regionalism over multilateralism. Formed in 1969, the 
Andean Community (Comunidad Andina: CAN) is the oldest trading 
bloc in South America.20 Throughout the 1970s, CAN sought to protect 
its domestic industry by implementing import substitution and high tar-
iffs.21 In the 1980s, CAN’s policies shifted towards an open market 
model.22 Since Venezuela’s departure in 2011, the Andean Community 
currently consists of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru.23 CAN is 
considered to be an imperfect customs union despite the fact that it es-
tablished a common external tariff in 1995.24 Initially, only Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Venezuela implemented this uniform tariff against non-
members, whereas Bolivia and Peru maintained their own national tariff 
system.25 Subsequent attempts to have the CAN members adhere to a 
common external tariff system have not been successful.26 
Beginning in the mid 1980s,27 there was an impetus among the 
Presidents of Brazil and Argentina to create a common market.28 Para-
guay and Uruguay, concerned that they would be excluded from a 
 
 19. Kembayev, supra note 10, at 28.  
 20. Lucien O. Chauvin, Regional Agreements: Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru Sign Decla-
ration Creating Pacific Alliance, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY (June 7, 2012), http://0-
news.bna.com.lucy.lls.edu/tdln/ (search “Pacific Alliance”; then follow 06/07/2012 hyperlink) 
[hereinafter Chauvin, Declaration Creating Pacific Alliance].  
 21. Reseña Histórica [Historical Review], COMUNIDAD ANDINA, 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/Seccion.aspx?id=195&tipo=QU&title=resena-historica (last 
visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
 22. “Del modelo de ‘sustitución de importaciones’ predominante en los setenta, que protegía 
la industria nacional con altos aranceles, se pasó al modelo abierto a finales de los ochenta.” Id. 
 23. Lucien O. Chauvin, Regional Agreements: Pacific Alliance Presidents Sign Pact Linking 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY (May 2, 2011), http://0-
news.bna.com.lucy.lls.edu/tdln/ (search “Pacific Alliance”; then follow 05/02/2011 hyperlink) 
[hereinafter Chauvin, Pacific Alliance Presidents Sign Pact Linking Chile, Colombia, Mexico, 
Peru]. 
 24. Política Arancelaria, COMUNIDAD ANDINA, 
http://www.comunidadandina.org/comercio/union.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) [hereinafter 
Política Arancelaria, COMUNIDAD ANDINA]. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Gabriel Loza Tellería, CAN o Mercosur, LA RAZÓN (Dec. 1, 2012), www.la
razon.com/opinion/columnistas/CANMercosur_0_1734426573.html; Política Arancelaria, 
COMUNIDAD ANDINA, supra note 24. 
 27. Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., Mercosur: The Common Market of the Twenty-First Centu-
ry?, 32 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 1, 10 (2004) [hereinafter Porrata-Doria]. 
 28. Rafael A. Porrata-Doria, Jr., Mercosur at Twenty: from Adolescence to Adulthood?, 27 
Temp. Int’l & Comp. L.J. 1, 15 (2013) [hereinafter Porrata-Doria, Mercosur at Twenty]. 
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common market composed of their most valuable trading partners, 
quickly sought entry into this trade agreement.29 The Common Market 
of the South (Mercado Común del Sur: MERCOSUR) was established 
in 1991 under the Treaty of Asuncion.30 Initially focused on the promo-
tion of free trade,31 the nations of Mercosur—especially Argentina and 
Brazil—have turned to more protectionist measures in the last few 
years.32 Despite its name, Mercosur has not realized its goal of establish-
ing a common market and, as a result, there is no free movement of fac-
tors of production across borders.33 Nonetheless, for the last two dec-
ades, Mercosur members have maintained a mostly free trade area with 
one another and have adhered to the implementation of a common ex-
ternal tariff.34 
In the early 2000s, there were serious talks to expand NAFTA (a 
free trade area comprised of Canada, Mexico and the United States) into 
Central and South America.35 Unfortunately, the movement to form the 
thirty-four country Free Trade of the Americas (FTAA) was unable to 
take hold, in part due to Brazil’s decision to leave the negotiations.36 
Another factor that took the wind out of the sails of the FTAA was the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (Alianza Bolivaria-
na para los Pueblos de Nuestra América: ALBA) guided by the ideo-
logical principles of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez.37 Created as the alterna-
tive to the FTAA, which promoted a free-market neoliberal approach, 
ALBA’s mission is to execute its own political and economic model 
based on academic Heinz Dieterich’s Twenty-first Century Socialism.38 
Currently, ALBA members include Antigua, Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, 
 
 29. Id. at 18. 
 30. Treaty Establishing a Common Market, Arg.-Braz.-Para.-Uru., Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 
1044, 1044 (1991). 
 31. Porrata-Doria, Mercosur at Twenty, supra note 28, at 35. 
 32. Trade in Latin America: Unity is Strength, ECONOMIST (Mar. 10, 2012), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/21549939. 
 33. Mark Keller, Explainer: What Is Mercosur?, AM. SOC’Y / COUNCIL OF THE AMS. (Aug. 
2, 2012), http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-what-mercosur-0.  
 34. Id. 
 35. Trade in Latin America: Unity is Strength, supra note 32. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Susan Schmidt & Gabrielle Doyle, The Pacific Alliance: Will Latin America’s Newest 
Regional Initiative Be Able to Keep its Eyes on the Prize?, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L TRADE 
DAILY (June 14, 2013), http://0-news.bna.com.lucy.lls.edu/tdln/ (search “Pacific Alliance”; then 
follow “next” hyperlink; then follow “06/14/2013: The Pacific Alliance: Will Latin America’s 
newest regional initiative be able to keep its eyes on the prize?” hyperlink) [hereinafter Schmidt 
& Doyle]. 
 38. Joel D. Hirst, A Guide to ALBA: What is the Bolivarian Alternative to the Americas and 
What Does It Do?, AMS. QUARTERLY, http://www.americasquarterly.org/hirst/article (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2013). 
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Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent, the Grena-
dines, Suriname, and Venezuela.39 
In 2008, negotiations began to unite the Andean Community and 
Mercosur into the Union of South American Nations (Unión de Nacio-
nes Suramericanas: UNASUR).40 The twelve-nation UNASUR became 
a legal entity upon the signing of the Constitutive Treaty on March 
2011.41 Its long-term projects include the construction of an inter-
oceanic highway to open passage from Brazil to the Pacific Ocean, the 
establishment of free trade, and a goal to implement a single currency in 
the future.42 UNASUR’s membership currently includes Argentina, Bo-
livia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suri-
name, Uruguay, and Venezuela.43 
In the summer of 2012, the composition of Mercosur was suddenly 
altered. On June 21, 2012, the Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo 
was impeached—almost unanimously.44 This occurred after his leftist 
ambitions to distribute land resulted in the death of eleven peasants and 
six policemen during an eviction proceeding, just six days prior to his 
impeachment (June 15, 2012).45 The speedy turn of events was seen by 
many to be evidence of a plot by the right wing to regain control of the 
nation.46 In response, the three other members of Mercosur—Argentina, 
Brazil and Uruguay—decided in July to suspend Paraguay for a year.47 
By the end of July, Venezuela was subsequently admitted to Mercosur48 
despite Paraguay’s prior contentions that Venezuela did not “meet the 
democratic standards to participate.”49 With Paraguay’s temporary sus-
pension, Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay were able to turn a blind eye to 
 
 39. Schmidt & Doyle, supra note 37. 
 40. Historia, UNASUR, http://www.unasursg.org/es/historia (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (“Al 
entrar en vigencia el Tratado Constitutivo en marzo de 2011. . . La Unión de Naciones Surameri-
canas impulsa una serie de proyectos a largo plazo que integrarán a Suramérica en forma y fondo: 
la construcción de una carretera interoceánica que abrirá el paso de Brasil hacia el Océano Pacífi-
co, el establecimiento del libre comercio y en un futuro, probablemente una moneda única”). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  
 43. Id. 
 44. Paraguay’s impeachment: Lugo out in the cold, ECONOMIST (June 30, 2012), available 
at http://www.economist.com/node/21557802. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. The expansion of Mercosur: In by the back door, ECONOMIST (Aug. 3, 2012), 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/americasview/2012/08/expansion-mercosur. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Rossella Brevetti, Paraguay Wants Mercosur Fixed Before Rejoining Group, Envoy 
Says, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY (July 24, 2013), http://0-
news.bna.com.lucy.lls.edu/tdln/ (search “Pacific Alliance”; then follow 07/24/2013 hyperlink) 
[hereinafter Brevetti, Paraguay Wants Mercosur Fixed]. 
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Mercosur’s requirement of unanimity to admit a new member.50 
What began as a lofty initiative of Peruvian President Alan Garcia 
to create a widespread free trade area in the Americas, the Pacific Alli-
ance (Alianza del Pacifico) developed into a four-way agreement be-
tween Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.51 It was launched by heads of 
state in 2011,52 formally established in 2012,53 and officially signed at 
UN headquarters in 2013.54 Desiring a free trade area as a prerequisite to 
founding the Pacific Alliance, all four nations had already established 
bilateral free trade agreements with one another by February 1, 2012.55 
The official UN signing on September 25, 2013 immediately eliminated 
tariffs on 92% of goods between members.56 On February 10, 2014 the 
four presidents signed an eighteen-chapter trade protocol in which the 
remaining tariffs on eight percent of goods (consisting of politically 
sensitive agricultural products) are to be phased out in a specified num-
ber of years.57 The Pacific Alliance aims to promote the development of 
its member countries through deeper economic integration that will fa-
cilitate “the free movement of goods, services, capital and persons.”58 
The Pacific Alliance also seeks to become a platform for member na-
 
 50. The expansion of Mercosur: In by the back door, supra note 47. 
 51. Chauvin, Pacific Alliance Presidents Sign Pact Linking Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, 
supra note 23. 
 52. April 28, 2011. Id. 
 53. Chauvin, Declaration Creating Pacific Alliance, supra note 20. 
 54. September 25, 2013. Lucien O. Chauvin, Regional Agreements: Latin America’s Pacific 
Alliance Signs Deal to Eliminate Tariffs on 92 Percent of Goods, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L 
TRADE DAILY (Sept. 30, 2013), available at http://0-news.bna.com.lucy.lls.edu/tdln/ (search “Pa-
cific Alliance”; then follow 09/30/2013 hyperlink) [hereinafter Chauvin, Latin America’s Pacific 
Alliance Signs Deal]. 
 55. Chauvin, Declaration Creating Pacific Alliance, supra note 20. 
 56. Chauvin, Latin America’s Pacific Alliance Signs Deal, supra note 54. 
 57. Lucien O. Chauvin, Latin America Countries Ink New Trade Deal Eliminating Tariffs on 
92 Percent of Goods, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY (Feb. 11, 2014),  http://0-
news.bna.com.lucy.lls.edu/tdln/ (search “Pacific Alliance”; then follow 02/12/2014 hyperlink) 
[hereinafter Chauvin, Latin America Countries Ink New Trade Deal]. All that is left to fully im-
plement these measures is to submit the trade protocol to the legislatures of the respective Pacific 
Alliance countries for approval. Lucien O. Chauvin, South America’s Pacific Alliance Moved 
Toward Agreement on Zero-Tariff Zone, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY (Feb. 7, 
2014),  http://0-news.bna.com.lucy.lls.edu/tdln/ (search “Pacific Alliance”; then follow 
02/10/2014 hyperlink) [hereinafter Chauvin, South America’s Pacific Alliance Moves Toward 
Agreement]. 
 58. The Pacific Alliance ABCs, ALIANZA DEL PACIFICO, http://alianzapacifico.net/wp-
content/uploads/2013/07/ABC-ALIANZA-DEL-PACIFICO-PRENSA-INGLES.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 20, 2013) [hereinafter The Pacific Alliance ABCs, 2013]; see also Rossella Brevetti, Pacific 
Alliance Countries Will Establish Integration Agendas, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY 
(Oct. 1, 2013), http://0-news.bna.com.lucy.lls.edu/tdln/ (search “Pacific Alliance”; then follow 
10/01/2013 hyperlink) [hereinafter Brevetti, Pacific Alliance Countries Will Establish Integration 
Agendas]. 
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tions to coordinate trade with Asia.59 Thus, the Pacific Alliance has tak-
en steps to implement a genuinely free trade area, as evidenced by the 
UN signing. In contrast to CAN and Mercosur, the Pacific Alliance does 
not intend to become a customs union or a common market.60 Instead, it 
seeks to maximize its benefits by adopting elements of a common mar-
ket while avoiding the limitations of a customs union. The aim of the 
Alliance is to deepen its integration with the free movement of factors 
of production,61 a characteristic present in common markets. At the 
same time, the Pacific Alliance encourages its members to engage in 
free trade agreements with non-members,62 a characteristic that would 
be implicitly discouraged if a common external tariff were to be estab-
lished. 
III. FACTORS FOR SUCCESS 
A. Common National Characteristics 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru independently possess charac-
teristics in common that will facilitate the integration process ushered in 
by the Pacific Alliance. These countries share a common heritage since 
all possessed an indigenous inheritance, became Spanish Colonies in the 
sixteenth century, and gained independence from Spain in the early 
nineteenth century.63 Mexico, Peru, Chile, and Colombia also share a 
cultural resemblance in that the principal language spoken is Spanish 
and the predominant religion is Roman Catholic.64 These two innate 
characteristics establish the context from which nations communicate 
and perceive one another. Also of note, these countries share a favorite 
pastime—soccer. Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico’s shared Hispanic 
roots enable these nations to rapidly advance towards the essential top-
ics of integration rather than tiptoeing around unfamiliar customs. 
Admittedly, geographical proximity is not a particularly prevalent 
characteristic for the Pacific Alliance members given that northern 
 
 59. Chauvin, Declaration Creating Pacific Alliance, supra note 20; see also The Pacific Al-
liance ABCs, 2013, supra note 58. 
 60. Jesper Tvevad, The Pacific Alliance: Regional integration or fragmentation?, EUR. 
PARLIAMENT 1, 17 (Jan. 10, 2014), 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2014/522318/EXPO-
AFET_SP(2014)522318_EN.pdf. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Roger A. Kittleson, History of Latin America, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,  
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/331694/history-of-Latin-America (last visited Nov. 
22, 2013).  
 64. Id. 
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Mexico is roughly as far from the southernmost tip of Chile as England 
is from South Africa.65 However, the need for geographical proximity is 
lessened where ocean transportation is available, especially since each 
member-nation has significant Pacific Ocean borders. In fact, the dis-
tance between these nations may even be considered an opportunity. 
Antoni Estevadeordal of the Inter-American Development Bank sees 
the Pacific Alliance as an incentive for its member-nations to further 
expand and enhance their transportation systems.66 
In addition to common heritage, cultural resemblance, shared lan-
guage, and geographical accessibility, these countries also possess simi-
lar per-capita GDP levels, outward-looking trade policies and stable 
democratic government regimes.67 Upon the initial launch of the Pacific 
Alliance in 2011, the GDP per capita68 levels were $20,154 (Chile), 
$15,887 (Mexico), $10,429 (Peru), and $11,332 (Colombia).69 The dif-
ference in GDP levels between the Pacific Alliance countries is not 
much when compared to that of the nations of Mercosur.70 The GDP per 
capita levels of Mercosur members in 2011 were $17,645 (Uruguay), 
$14,301 (Brazil), and $7,186 (Paraguay).71 Even twenty years after the 
establishment of the Mercosur customs union, the per capita GDP of 
Uruguay is almost two and a half times more than that of Paraguay.72 
While GDP per capita cannot plainly represent the average quality of 
life, it does indicate the general development of the country and the 
quality of programs that can be carried out by its government. 
As indicated by the numbers above, Paraguay is in fact suffering 
from a lack of infrastructure.  In 2007, Mercosur established a Structural 
Convergence Fund (FOCEM) to alleviate the disparity between its 
members.73 Since then Paraguay has been allocated approximately $201 
million in funds for “road construction, water system improvements, 
 
 65. Latin American geoeconomics: A continental divide, ECONOMIST (May 18, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21578056-region-falling-behind-two-alternative-
blocks-market-led-pacific-alliance-and. 
 66. Id. 
 67. For a similar analysis of Mercosur nations, see Kembayev, supra note 10, at 38-39. 
 68. GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), THE WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD/countries?display=default (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2013). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. Argentina’s GDP per capita was not specified here because there were no reported 
values for Argentina at any point in time in the World Bank GDP per capita, PPP (current interna-
tional $) data. 
 72. Uruguay’s GDP ($17,645) ÷ Paraguay’s GDP ($7,186) = 245.55%.  
 73. Porrata-Doria, Mercosur at Twenty, supra note 28, at 20−21. 
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and electrical infrastructure improvements.”74 Nonetheless, Paraguay’s 
infrastructure and markets are so far behind those of Argentina, Brazil 
and Uruguay that, to date, even the substantial FOCEM funding has not 
been able to improve Paraguay’s position relative to the other Mercosur 
members.75 
In contrast, the difference is not as prevalent for the Pacific Alli-
ance members: the per capita GDP of Chile is only about two times 
greater than that of Peru.76 Furthermore, even the two lowest GDP per 
capita values ($11,332 in Colombia and $10,429 in Peru) of the Pacific 
Alliance members are not far below the 2011 world average of 
$13,410.77 Having substantially similar GDPs per capita suggests that 
these nations have comparable levels of infrastructure. As a result, the 
Pacific Alliance members can instead focus on what future steps to take 
to maximize trade benefits rather than expending resources in hopes to 
get one nation at the same economic level as the others. 
The four Pacific Alliance nations are notable for their extensive 
number of trade agreements and their domestic regulations favoring the 
creation of business—demonstrating their common outward-looking 
trade policies. While the average member of the WTO is involved in 
thirteen trade agreements,78 Colombia, Peru, Mexico, and Chile have fif-
teen, seventeen, nineteen, and twenty-two trade agreements, respective-
ly.79 And these trade agreements result in preferential trade terms with 
sixty-two, fifty, fifty-two, and sixty countries, respectively.80 A similar, 
shared view of trade policies facilitates cohesion and cooperation 
among Pacific Alliance members because it implicitly establishes a 
commonly agreed upon goal. Additionally, the Pacific Alliance coun-
tries are among the top thirty percent of 189 nations ranked for “Ease of 
Doing Business” in 2013.81 Finally, within Latin America and the Car-
ibbean’s thirty-three nations, the Pacific Alliance members rank first 
(Chile), third (Peru), fourth (Colombia) and fifth (Mexico).82 A mutually 
 
 74. Id. at 21-22. 
 75. Id. at 24-25. 
 76. GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), supra note 68. Chile’s GDP ($20,154) ÷ 
Peru’s GDP ($10,429) = 193.25% 
 77. GDP per capita, PPP (current international $), supra note 68.  
 78. WORLD TRADE REPORT 2011, supra note 4, at 47. 
 79. The Pacific Alliance ABCs, ALIANZA DEL PACIFICO, 
http://alianzapacifico.net/documents/2014/AbeceINGLES%202014.pdf (last visited Oct. 20, 
2014) [hereinafter The Pacific Alliance ABCs, 2014]. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Economy Rankings, WORLD BANK GROUP, http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
 82. Id. In contrast, Mercosur nations rank fourteenth (Uruguay), twenty-first (Paraguay), 
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high ease of doing business, which facilitates “the starting and operation 
of a local firm,”83 increases the returns for the Pacific Alliance nations 
when they open their borders to increase trade since growth in demand 
can be quickly met by increase in production. 
Moreover, the Pacific Alliance members have, on the whole, em-
braced and upheld democratic governments.84 The Vienna-based Global 
Democracy Ranking ranks 110 nations each year, with the number one 
rank being the “most democratic” nation.85 Between 2008 to 2013, Chile 
and Colombia increased their ranking (thirty-one to twenty-four and six-
ty to fifty-four, respectively).86 In the same time frame, Mexico and Pe-
ru decreased in rank (forty to fifty-three and forty-one to forty-six, re-
spectively) but are still in the top 50% of the world’s most democratic 
nations.87 By having relatively stable, democratic governments, the Pa-
cific Alliance nations can confidently rely on one another to adopt the 
necessary measures to achieve the goals of the Pacific Alliance. In con-
trast, political unrest results in nations with inherently unpredictable ob-
jectives that could cause potential members of a trade bloc to hesitate or 
turn away from the initiative for fear that the other nations will not up-
hold their promises. 
B. Policies That Foster Long-Run Economic Growth 
Neo-classical trade theory, in its most basic interpretation, states 
that all parties will be better off where there is free trade.88 This theory 
is the justification for many countries’ entry into trade agreements,89 and 
Latin American countries are no exception.90 Nonetheless, the tradition-
al trade theory does not take into account the market failures, which are 
 
twenty-third (Brazil), and twenty-seventh (Argentina) in Latin America and the Caribbean for 
Ease of Doing Business. 
 83. Id. 
 84. The Pacific Alliance ABCs, 2014, supra note 79. 
 85. Full dataset for the 2011 ranking, GLOBAL DEMOCRACY RANKING,  
http://democracyranking.org/wordpress/ranking/2011/data/Scores_of_the_Democracy_Ranking_
2011-letter.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Rachel Denae Thrasher & Kevin P. Gallagher, Twenty-First Century Trade Agreements: 
Implications for Development Sovereignty, 38 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 313, 314-15 (2010) 
[hereinafter Thrasher & Gallagher]. 
 89. Id. at 314. 
 90. See generally New Trade Agreements as Tools for Policy Reform and Economic Integra-
tion, INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/trade/new-trade-agreements-
as-tools-for-policy-reform-and-economic-integration,8555.html#.UmSK9tCYYdJ (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2013) [hereinafter New Trade Agreements as Tools] (stating that Latin American and Car-
ibbean nations have turned to free trade agreements as a way to fuel growth and reduce poverty). 
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prone to occur in developing nations after implementation of trade 
agreements.91 
The four principle market failures that typically result in these sit-
uations are coordination failures, information lapses, technological 
stagnation, and sub-optimal formation of human capital.92 Coordination 
among members of a trade agreement is key to attract foreign firms and 
investors, and the free flow of information is vital to ensure that produc-
ers are creating a desirable product for consumers.93 Without proper in-
centives, domestic entrepreneurs will continue to invest in “historically 
profitable industries in the primary products sectors”94 rather than taking 
the necessary risks associated with inventing new technologies.95 Hu-
man capital formation—such as education and training—is indispensa-
ble for long-term economic growth.96 Government-supported human 
capital formation programs are necessary because private markets alone 
are usually insufficient to maintain a socially optimal level of human 
capital.97 
The key for trade agreements among developing nations, such as 
the Pacific Alliance members, would be to implement policies that 
could reduce the severity of such market failures. East Asia’s steady 
growth over the last forty years demonstrates that region’s successful 
execution of such policies in order to reap the benefits of trade liberali-
zation.98 Experts agree that four general policies used by East Asian na-
tions rectified market failures while fostering dynamic comparative ad-
vantages: (1) the movement of people across borders, (2) investment in 
both human capital and public infrastructure, (3) effective public-private 
communication paths paired with results-based industry subsidies, and 
(4) loose intellectual property rules.99 These four categories shall be ex-
amined below to determine whether the Pacific Alliance has the neces-
sary foundation to promote long-run economic growth. 
First, the Pacific Alliance has made great strides in augmenting the 
movement of people across its borders. The foreign relations ministers 
of the four Pacific Alliance members have eliminated visas for interre-
 
 91. Thrasher & Gallagher, supra note 88, at 314-15. 
 92. Id. at 316. 
 93. Id. at 316-17. 
 94. Id. at 317. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 318.  
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 319-20; see also Zhaoyong Zhang, Trade Liberalization, Economic Growth and 
Convergence: Evidence From East Asian Economies, 16 J. ECON. INTEGRATION 147, 147 (2001).  
 99. Thrasher & Gallagher, supra note 88, at 319-20, 322. 
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gional travel in 2013 and plan to release a “Pacific Alliance” visa that 
permits members to travel to the rest of the world in 2014.100 The Pacific 
Alliance has demonstrated its long-term commitment to the free move-
ment of persons by dedicating one of its fourteen technical groups to 
“Movement of Business People and Facilitation of Migration.”101 Addi-
tionally, the Pacific Alliance has signed an agreement on tourism coop-
eration102 to increase the tourism travel within Pacific Alliance na-
tions.103 
Second, the Pacific Alliance has already begun investment in edu-
cation and research and in doing so revealed a concern for the continued 
development of human capital. Beginning in 2013, scholarships were 
awarded to undergraduate and postgraduate students and professors to 
use in the universities of Pacific Alliance countries.104 In 2013, 100 
scholarships per country were allotted and distributed subject to an ap-
plication process.105 The Pacific Alliance has also asserted that it will 
establish a fund to support research topics affecting long-run human 
productivity such as climate change, small and mid-sized businesses, 
and social development.106 
To date, the Pacific Alliance’s investment in infrastructure is 
noteworthy since it demonstrates the Alliance’s foresight and capacity 
to coordinate. The Pacific Alliance nations are very close to uniting 
their stock markets into the Integrated Latin American Market (Merca-
do Integrado Latino Americano: MILA).107 Peru, Chile, and Colombia 
have already joined their markets into MILA in 2011,108 and as of late 
2013, Mexico, close to obtaining legislative approval, is predicted to be 
joining in 2014.109 By consolidating their stock markets, Pacific Alliance 
members will benefit from lowered exchange costs and increased vol-
 
 100. Chauvin, Latin America’s Pacific Alliance Signs Deal, supra note 54. 
 101. The Pacific Alliance ABCs, 2013, supra note 58. 
 102. New Trade Agreements as Tools, supra note  90. 
 103. The Pacific Alliance ABCs, 2013, supra note 58. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Alejandro Rebossio, La region mira al Pacífico: alianzas que dejan fuera al Mer-
cosur, LA NACION (June 9, 2013),  http://www.lanacion.com.ar/1589843-la-region-mira-al-
pacifico-alianzas-que-dejan-fuera-al-mercosur. 
 107. Lucien O. Chauvin, Export Policy: Currency Rise, Trade Harmonization, Top Agenda of 
Pacific Alliance Meeting, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY (Apr. 29, 2013), http://0-
news.bna.com.lucy.lls.edu/tdln/ (search “Pacific Alliance”; then follow “next” hyperlink; then 
follow “04/29/2013: Export Policy: Currency Rise, Trade Harmonization, Top Agenda of Pacific 
Alliance Meeting” hyperlink) [hereinafter Chauvin, Currency Rise].  
 108. Id. 
 109. Brevetti, Pacific Alliance Countries Will Establish Integration Agendas, supra note 58; 
Chauvin, Currency Rise, supra note 107.  
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umes of traded stock, thus attracting more companies (both domestic 
and international) to sell stock through MILA.110 The finance ministers 
of the Pacific Alliance nations are currently working on adopting 
Chile’s single windows method to streamline trade flows.111 The single 
windows system “group[s] all necessary procedures for exporting and 
importing goods and services into one single body or agency” and in 
Chile has resulted in a 50% decrease in foreign trade operations expens-
es.112 Furthermore, the trade promotion agencies of the four Pacific Alli-
ance members have united their efforts to increase their global presence. 
In 2012, a joint trade promotion office was opened in Istanbul, Tur-
key.113 In 2013, the Pacific Alliance opened a joint diplomatic mission 
in Ghana114 and made its official launch in Dubai.115 The Alliance plans 
to open other joint trade promotion offices in Mumbai (Bombay), India, 
and Casablanca, Morocco.116 
Third, the Pacific Alliance has set up an effective communication 
path between itself and private businesses within the Alliance, which 
has allowed the future possibility of result-based industry subsidies. The 
Pacific Alliance Business Council (Consejo Empresarial de la Alianza 
del Pacifico: CEAP)—composed of fourteen high-level business people 
from the four member nations—was established in August 2012 to give 
business-perspective feedback and recommendations to the Pacific Alli-
ance.117 Since its founding, the CEAP has met on four occasions.118 To 
evaluate and apply the suggestions of the CEAP, the Pacific Alliance 
created the Expert Committee for the Pacific Alliance Business Sum-
 
 110. Pacific Alliance Bourses, MILA, Planned to be integrated by end of 
year, MERCOPRESS (June 21, 2014), http://en.mercopress.com/2014/06/21/pacific-alliance-
bourses-mila-planned-to-be-integrated-by-end-of-year. 
 111. Chauvin, Currency Rise, supra note 106; Chauvin, Latin America’s Pacific Alliance 
Signs Deal, supra note 54. 
 112. Chile expedites and lowers costs of foreign trade processes with IDB support, INTER-
AMERICAN DEV. BANK, http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/trade/chile-expedites-and-lowers-costs-of-
foreign-trade-processes-with-idb-support,8263.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013). 
 113. Chauvin, Latin America’s Pacific Alliance Signs Deal, supra note 54.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Issac John, Latin American Economic Bloc Makes Debut in Dubai, KHALEEJ 
TIMES (Dec. 11, 
2013),  http://khaleejtimes.com/biz/inside.asp?xfile=/data/uaebusiness/2013/December/uaebusine
ss_December116.xml&section=uaebusiness. 
 116. The Pacific Alliance ABCs, 2014, supra note 79. 
 117. Nneka Etoniru, Explainer: What is the Pacific Alliance?, AM. SOC’Y / COUNCIL OF THE 
AMS. (May 17, 2013), http://www.as-coa.org/articles/explainer-what-pacific-alliance. 
 118. Pacific Alliance Business Council Meets in New York, INTER-AMERICAN 
DEVELOPMENT BANK,  http://www.iadb.org/en/topics/trade/pacific-alliance-business-council-
meets-in-new-york,8825.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
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mit.119 This formalized path between the public and private sectors can 
enable the Pacific Alliance to “‘discover’ what the most pertinent mar-
ket failures and other impediments to industrial development are in an 
economy, and what assets there are in the economy that can be built up-
on, and to pick activities that will have the largest economy-wide ef-
fects.” 120 
Traditionally, trade bloc or government involvement in picking 
specific industries to subsidize often results in inefficiency due to rent-
seeking behavior and creates a risk that the government may pick “los-
ers” instead of “winners.”121 Such problems can be circumvented, or at 
least reduced, if the renewal of subsidies depends on the performance of 
those who received the subsidies.122 Then, a governing body can objec-
tively justify terminating investment in projects that are not producing 
positive results, and the possibility of losing the subsidy will incentivize 
the recipients to be efficient in order to retain government aid.123 Alt-
hough the Pacific Alliance has not implemented targeted industry subsi-
dies, the Alliance could use such a tool in the future to boost growth in 
key industries. 
Fourth, the important policy of loose intellectual property rules is 
not an end in itself but instead describes an environment where learning 
from foreign nations is encouraged and where public research and de-
velopment is accessible.124 A prime example is Chile’s funding program, 
which began in 2010. “Start-Up Chile” gives founders of promising 
firms (both international and domestic) $40,000 and a one year visa 
with the condition that recipients work in Chile for 6 months and in the 
meantime share their knowledge with Chileans—for example, as event 
speakers or as coaches to local entrepreneurs.125 With the success of this 
program, which has resulted in the nickname “Chilecon Valley,”126 the 
Pacific Alliance could very well implement a similar program on a larg-
er scale. Even though additional funding and coordination is necessary 
in order to expand this program, such a move would be wise. Expanding 
the program will not only increase innovation domestically, but also dis-
incentivize free-rider behavior that may arise if Chile continues the pro-
 
 119. The Pacific Alliance ABCs, 2014, supra note 79. 
 120. Thrasher & Gallagher, supra note 88, at 322. 
 121. Id. at 321. 
 122. Id. at 322. 
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 320. 
 125. Entrepreneurs in Latin America: The lure of Chilecon Valley, ECONOMIST (Oct. 13, 
2012), available at www.economist.com/node/21564589. 
 126. Id. 
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gram while factors of production flow freely among members. 
C. Lessons to be Learned From Mercosur 
Establishing a supranational entity and an effective resolution sys-
tem are key for the longevity of the Pacific Alliance. Without a suprana-
tional entity, the implementation and progress of the regional trade 
agreement must rely on the perpetual consensus of all the member na-
tions.127 Thus, a regional trade agreement’s progress might be paralyzed 
if the members do not agree. An ineffective dispute resolution system 
provides no meaningful penalties against the member who violates 
community norms, resulting in little incentive to comply with such 
norms.128 In turn, the effectiveness of the regional trade agreement is 
weakened.129 As predicted and later confirmed by Temple University 
Law Professor Rafael A. Porrata-Doria Jr.,130 Mercosur’s failure to ef-
fectuate these two establishments has added both to the discontent felt 
by Mercosur’s smaller nations as well as the ineffectiveness of Mer-
cosur’s measures to further integration. 
Mercosur has endeavored to establish a supranational entity by 
creating the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) in 
2003 and the Mercosur parliament (PARLASUR) in 2005.131 These at-
tempts, however, have been unsuccessful given that the institutions 
were given neither binding authority nor legislative powers. COREPER, 
lacking in both decision-making and implementation powers, has ceased 
to be active.132 PARLASUR’s powers are of a “liaison and consultative 
nature” since a majority of the organization’s work is to make recom-
mendations.133 According to Mercosur’s official website, there has been 
no PARLASUR activity since 2010.134 Therefore, Mercosur has contin-
ued to resort to the decisions of the Brazilian and Argentinian presidents 
as its “principal policy-making and agenda-setting instrument.”135 As a 
consequence, Paraguay and Uruguay have felt increasingly discontent 
regarding their second-class status within Mercosur.136 
 
 127. Porrata-Doria, Mercosur at Twenty, supra note 28, at 1. 
 128. See id. at 33. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 1-2. 
 131. Id. at 26, 29. 
 132. Id. at 30. 
 133. Id. at 27-28. 
 134. Id. at 28. 
 135. Id. at 19. 
 136. Id. “[Uruguay and Paraguay] described a situation of ‘sub-imperialism,’ arguing that 
‘Argentina and Brazil had long orchestrated programs within Mercosur that disproportionally 
benefitted their larger domestic markets’ and noted that radical changes in regional policy were 
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The Pacific Alliance has yet to establish a supranational entity 
whose actions are binding upon all members, and it is unclear if there 
are plans to create such an entity in the future.137 The Pacific Alliance’s 
current structure begins with the Presidents of the four member coun-
tries, who are the ultimate decision makers.138 Next, the Council of Min-
isters has the authority to make lesser decisions but only as permissible 
within the Framework Agreement.139 As an example of a durable re-
gional trade agreement, the European Union has established various su-
pranational entities that together have binding legislative authority, such 
as the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council, and the 
European Commission.140 Even though the members have not encoun-
tered significant discord amongst themselves to date, the Pacific Alli-
ance would highly benefit from establishing a supranational entity, as it 
would act as a safeguard against otherwise immobilizing disagreements 
that may come up in the future. 
Mercosur has also been unable to establish an effective dispute 
resolution system.141 In order to have an effective dispute resolution sys-
tem: (1) it must be regularly used; (2) it should generate a body of juris-
prudence that is cited and followed; and (3) the parties must agree to be 
bound by its decisions.142 Despite the additional legislative support 
brought forth from the Brasilia and Olivos Protocols,143 Mercosur’s arbi-
tration and Permanent Revision Tribunal has failed to exercise meaning-
ful authority.144 Both tribunal levels were hesitant to impose sanctions 
when violations of Mercosur norms were present; and even when sanc-
tions were imposed, the member states simply ignored the tribunals.145 
Furthermore, the tribunals were seldom used and their decisions did not 
create a cohesive jurisprudence.146 
In contrast, the Court of Justice of the European Union, since it’s 
 
needed.” Id.  
 137. Tvevad, supra note 60, at 17-18. 
 138. Structure and Organization Chart, THE PAC. ALLIANCE, 
http://alianzapacifico.net/en/home-eng/structure-and-organization-chart/ (last visited Feb. 26, 
2014). 
 139. Id. 
 140. How the European Union Works, EUROPA, http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/how-the-
european-union-works-pbNA0113090/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2014) (click the download link). 
 141. Porrata-Doria, Mercosur at Twenty, supra note 28, at 30-33. 
 142. Id. at 25. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 33. 
 145. Id.  
 146. Id. at 31. For a more in-depth discussion of why Mercosur’s dispute resolution system is 
ineffective, see Porrata-Doria, Mercosur at Twenty, supra note 28, at 30-33. 
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establishment in 1952, has given 28,000 judgments147 containing com-
prehensive fundamental principles derived from case law.148 The Pacific 
Alliance has generally stated that it has established an agency that will 
resolve disputes, but it is unclear if the results of this agency are binding 
and if they have the means to enforce their decisions.149 The Americas 
Society / Council of the Americas (AS/COA) hosted a panel examining 
the Pacific Alliance on May 24, 2013.150 There, it was predicted that the 
Pacific Alliance was likely to “resolve disputes with panels consisting 
of representatives of all the parties to the [trade] agreement” similar to 
the system used in NAFTA.151 
Despite these two long-run issues, the Pacific Alliance is likely to 
address these issues with more success than Mercosur, due to the Alli-
ance’s innovative “early harvest” approach.152 Rather than coming to an 
agreement only when all the issues have been resolved, the early harvest 
strategy encourages the easiest issues to be resolved first and for agree-
ments to be made at various intervals.153 The early harvest method has 
been used by the Pacific Alliance members since its conception and the 
rapidity of the ensuing agreements has “buil[t] momentum and confi-
dence” in the Alliance’s integration process.154 By addressing one issue 
at a time, the Pacific Alliance countries have had an opportunity to up-
date their respective national assemblies periodically rather than all at 
once.155 This has increased national support and awareness for the pro-
cess with minimal opposition, since it is highly unlikely that a single is-
sue will attract a significant amount of protest.156 
Additionally, the Pacific Alliance is still in its infancy, so there is 
no immediate rush to establish a formidable bureaucracy. Nonetheless, 
the Pacific Alliance’s infancy can be a weakness because it is uncertain 
how a change in a member-nation’s president will affect the Pacific Al-
 
 147. General Presentation, COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUR. UNION, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_6999/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
 148. Presentation, COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUR. UNION, 
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_7024/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
 149. The Pacific Alliance ABCs, 2014, supra note 79. 
 150. Andres Sada, The Pacific Alliance: Pivoting to Asia, AM. SOC’Y / COUNCIL OF THE AM. 
(May 24, 2013), http://www.as-coa.org/articles/summary-%E2%80%93-pacific-alliance-pivoting-
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 152. Carlo Dade & Carl Meacham, The Pacific Alliance: An Example of Lessons Learned, 
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. 1, 6 (July 11, 2013), 
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 153. Id. at 2, 6. 
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 156. Id. 
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liance.157 Future presidents—not familiar with the creation and early 
hurdles of the Pacific Alliance—may be tempted to steer the Pacific Al-
liance away from its presently effective and pragmatic system.158 In Pe-
ru, it was believed unlikely that the new Peruvian President, Ollanta 
Humala, would continue Peru’s participation in the Pacific Alliance.159 
In anticipation of such an outcome, the former Peruvian President, Alan 
Garcia, invited the then presidential candidate Humala to attend a Pacif-
ic Alliance meeting in 2011.160 As a result, Humala has seamlessly 
maintained Peru’s involvement in the Pacific Alliance.161 In Chile, time 
has yet to tell whether the presidency of Michelle Bachelet (in her sec-
ond, non-consecutive term) will result in continued support of the Pacif-
ic Alliance. Even before her term began on March 2014, Bachelet wel-
comed Brazil’s ex-president, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, who visited to 
promote Mercosur on November 2013.162 Bachelet also maintains close 
relations with the presidents of Brazil (Dilma Rousseff) and Argentina 
(Cristina Fernández).163 Although it is vital to retain good relations with 
Mercosur, Bachelet’s center-left political agenda might leave the Pacific 
Alliance as a secondary concern.164 Despite the changing presidencies of 
the member nations, the Pacific Alliance’s current success is a great in-
centive for future presidents of Peru, Chile, Mexico, and Colombia to 
continue working together.165 
IV. THE POLARIZING EFFECT OF THE PACIFIC ALLIANCE’S SUCCESS 
A. Damaging Perceptions 
The Pacific Alliance is likely to attract criticism even if this trade 
bloc is successful in accomplishing its goals. In fact, it already has at-
tracted criticism. In July 2013, various officials of Mercosur’s member-
 
 157. Moisés Naím, The Most Important Alliance You’ve Never Heard Of, THE ATLANTIC 
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 158. Dade & Meacham, supra note 152, at 9. 
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 162. Benedict Mander, Chilean Companies Face Change, Not Revolution, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 
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00144feabdc0.html#axzz2rIqVRN9W. 
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countries claimed that the Pacific Alliance’s focus on free trade would 
distract Latin American countries from their social objectives.166 Those 
opposed to the Pacific Alliance say that free trade will continue the ex-
port of raw commodities, which is not sustainable in the long run.167 
Additionally, they believe that the Pacific Alliance’s market driven 
growth will not lead to inclusive development.168 Such vocal opposition 
against the Pacific Alliance from Mercosur supporters seems to suggest 
a growing resentment and an “us versus them” mentality. Contrary to 
the criticisms, the Pacific Alliance has taken steps to address social ob-
jectives. As mentioned previously, the Alliance has allotted a total of 
400 undergraduate and postgraduate scholarships in 2013 and has de-
clared that it will establish a fund to support research topics such as cli-
mate change, small and mid-size businesses, and social development.169 
Even though social objectives are not being grossly overlooked by the 
Pacific Alliance, the fact that non-Pacific Alliance nations of the Latin 
American community perceive otherwise might be damaging to the Pa-
cific Alliance’s future trade relations with these nations. 
The way in which Paraguay was suspended from Mercosur is an 
example of the extensive damage that can result from other countries’ 
perception of controversial events. Soon after the lightning-fast im-
peachment of the Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo on June 21, 
2012, Argentina and Venezuela declared that they would not recognize 
the new President Federico Franco.170 Venezuela also said it would stop 
sending oil to Paraguay.171 Then, one week later on June 28, 2012, Para-
guay’s Mercosur partners—Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina—decided to 
suspend Paraguay for a year.172 This suspension meant that Paraguay’s 
unfavorable vote regarding Venezuela’s inclusion in Mercosur was 
overlooked.173 Furthermore, upon lifting the suspension in July 2013, 
Paraguay was not permitted to assume the remaining months of the ro-
tating presidency of Mercosur as scheduled.174 These political sanctions, 
which had an expansive economic effect, occurred despite the fact that 
the impeachment of Lugo was carried out in strict accordance with Par-
 
 166. See Mercosur Social Summit Criticizes the Pacific Alliance and Blasts Free trade, 
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aguay’s constitution.175 Even compliance with their own law and an al-
most unanimous senate vote was not enough to demonstrate legitimacy 
of the process to neighboring nations, and this perception of wrongdo-
ing resulted in serious consequences for Paraguay.176 Paraguay’s unfor-
tunate case is an important lesson for Pacific Alliance nations to re-
member. 
Another damaging external perspective that various nations have 
of the Pacific Alliance is that the Alliance is an extension of US power 
that seeks to undermine socially-focused regional integration efforts and 
instead, impose a market-driven free trade economy.177 On August 6, 
2013, the Foro de São Paulo, an organization that supports and evalu-
ates Mercosur, claimed that in addition to being a US tool, the Pacific 
Alliance had generated crises and divisions within Mercosur itself.178  
Here, not only is the Pacific Alliance criticized, but it is also blamed for 
Mercosur’s problems. Atilio Borón, an Argentinian intellectual, be-
lieves that the U.S. organized the Pacific Alliance with the purpose of 
eroding UNASUR.179 This perception is damaging—whether or not it is 
true, or to what extent—because it will cause nations that are wary of 
U.S. involvement in Latin America to stop or limit their trade relation-
ships with Pacific Alliance members. The criticisms expressed against 
the Pacific Alliance could result in strained relations with non-member 
countries and impede the regional flow of trade, thus dampening eco-
nomic growth. 
B. One or the Other 
Now that there will be two major trade blocs in South America 
(Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance), any country that joins or becomes 
affiliated with either bloc will necessarily have revealed its values, 
whether ideological or pragmatic. Since July 2013, Bolivia and Ecuador 
have both been associate members to Mercosur, meaning that they can 
participate in Mercosur discussions, but cannot vote.180 Both nations as-
 
 175. Paraguay Becomes Observer of the Alliance of the Pacific, Despite Brazil and Mer-
cosur, MERCOPRESS (May 25, 2013 4:29 UTC), http://en.mercopress.com/2013/05/25/paraguay-
becomes-observer-of-the-alliance-of-the-pacific-despite-brazil-and-mercosur [hereinafter Para-
guay Becomes Observer of the Alliance of the Pacific].   
 176. Paraguay’s impeachment: Lugo out in the cold, supra note 44. 
 177. Detlef Nolte & Leslie Wehner, The Pacific Alliance Casts Its Cloud over Latin America, 
GERMAN INST. OF GLOBAL & AREA STUD. 1, 4 (2013), http://www.giga-
hamburg.de/en/system/files/publications/gf_international_1308.pdf.  
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Venezuelan parliament approves incorporation of Bolivia to Mercosur as full member, 
MERCOPRESS (July 18, 2013, 8:26 UTC), http://en.mercopress.com/2013/07/18/venezuelan-
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pire to join Mercosur as full members, but that requires the approval of 
all five Mercosur nations (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and 
Venezuela).181 Indirectly aimed at the Pacific Alliance, Ecuadorian Pres-
ident Rafael Correa stated that Ecuador would never join a bloc that of-
fered only a free market or an open economy.182 Furthermore, Bolivian 
President Evo Morales said that the Pacific Alliance is part of a U.S. 
conspiracy to divide UNASUR and so “can’t advance the definitive lib-
eration of our peoples.”183 In choosing to join Mercosur, it appears that 
these countries have found it necessary to also announce their disap-
proval of the Pacific Alliance rather than remaining open to the idea that 
both trade blocs can work together. 
On the other hand, Mercosur nations Paraguay and Uruguay have 
both obtained observer membership to the Pacific Alliance.184 Their de-
cision to create stronger bonds with the Pacific Alliance seems to stem 
from their growing discontent with Mercosur.185 Paraguay’s status as an 
observer to the Alliance as of May 2013 was met by strong opposition 
by Brazilian lobbyists who felt that Paraguay’s suspension should have 
prevented Paraguay from seeking trade ties with other countries.186 Re-
garding its suspension from Mercosur, Paraguay’s ambassador to the 
United States, Fernando Pfannl Caballero, felt that it would be difficult 
for Paraguay to move forward considering that the nation’s dignity had 
been offended in the process.187 As early as 2006, Uruguay’s finance 
minister felt that it depended too much upon the goodwill of Argentina 
and Brazil, and since then, Uruguay has sought to expand trade relations 
beyond Mercosur.188 Uruguay became an observer to the Pacific Alli-
ance in early 2013, a month or two before Paraguay.189 Even so, Uru-
guay has found it difficult to expand its trade partners since Mercosur 
rules state that third party agreements require the unanimous consent of 
the other Mercosur nations.190 Uruguay and Paraguay seem to be turning 
 
parliament-approves-incorporation-of-bolivia-to-mercosur-as-full-member. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Ecuador’s Correa pondering whether to join Mercosur or the Pacific Alliance, 
MERCOPRESS (July 31, 2013, 6:09 UTC), http://en.mercopress.com/2013/07/31/ecuador-s-correa-
pondering-whether-to-join-mercosur-or-the-pacific-alliance. 
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MERCOPRESS (Oct. 14, 2013, 23:40 UTC), http://en.mercopress.com/2013/10/14/bolivian-
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 185. Id.  
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towards the Pacific Alliance as an alternative to the stringent limitations 
imposed by Mercosur. 
The Pacific Alliance was founded with a pragmatic emphasis on 
achieving global competitiveness rather than having a geopolitical or 
ideological focus.191 Mercosur’s agenda has lately been characterized by 
an increasingly ideological focus, especially after the admission of Ven-
ezuela.192 Despite the fact that the Pacific Alliance and Mercosur are op-
erating on two distinct planes of thought, the geographic juxtaposition 
of the two trade blocs makes it easy to contrast the two. Nonetheless, it 
is vital for South American nations to refrain from entering the mindset 
that the two trade blocs are incompatible rivals. 
C. Lost Opportunities 
It may be counterproductive for Pacific Alliance nations to put 
forth so much effort into integrating with one another if it results in al-
ienating these nations from their Latin American neighbors. Popular 
dislike from non-Pacific Alliance nations may lead to lowered or stag-
nant levels of intra-regional trade within the continent. If that happens, 
Latin America will be at a patent disadvantage in the path to becoming 
developed nations. On January 4, 2014, the Economist recommended 
that twenty-year-old NAFTA expand its links beyond its members and 
warned against “building a Fortress North America in which the three 
countries try to boost their mutual competitiveness at the expense of the 
rest of the world.”193 The Economist’s advice to NAFTA is applicable to 
Mercosur, who has of late opted for protectionist measures.194 This ad-
vice is also relevant to the Pacific Alliance, which in spite of being very 
open to trade on a worldwide scale,195 may not be making the most of its 
trade relations with other Latin American nations. 
 
Waking up to the Significance and Impact of the Pacific Alliance, MERCOPRESS (July 1, 2014, 
10:16 UTC), http://en.mercopress.com/2014/07/01/mercosur-waking-up-to-the-significance-and-
impact-of-the-pacific-alliance. 
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 191. Dade & Meacham, supra note 152, at 2. 
 192. Latin American geoeconomics: A continental divide, supra note 65. 
 193. NAFTA at 20: Ready to Take Off Again?, ECONOMIST (Jan. 4, 2014), available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21592631-two-decades-ago-north-american-free-trade-
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 194. Latin American geoeconomics: A continental divide, supra note 65. The Economist did 
in fact urge Brazil to pursue increased free trade in March 2012 stating, “Regional integration, not 
protectionism, is the right response to fears of deindustrialization.” Trade in Latin America: Unity 
is Strength, supra note 32. 
 195. This is especially true in regards to Asia: “The Alliance countries already have more 
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As of 2012, intra-regional trade in Central and South America is 
only 26.9% of the region’s total merchandise exports whereas it is 
68.6% in Europe, 53.4% in Asia, and 48.6% in North America.196 The 
International Monetary Fund Survey Magazine considered high intra-
regional trade to be the key to Asia’s economic growth in the early 
2000s.197 In November 2012, Consultancy Africa Intelligence asserted 
that Africa, with a 12.8% of intra-regional trade as of 2012,198 could 
boost growth by overcoming barriers to intra-regional trade.199 While 
the ultimate goal for the Pacific Alliance members may be economic 
globalization, a focus on increasing intra-regional trade will aid these 
countries in “addressing many of the constraints to [their] trade, such as 
poor infrastructure, complex domestic regulation and insufficient pro-
ductive capacity.”200 By addressing such problems, the Pacific Alliance 
will enhance its capacity for intra-regional trade and simultaneously im-
prove their extra-regional trade.201 
Furthermore, there are immediate benefits to trading within Latin 
America, such as lowered transportation costs and decreased time for 
delivery. Short-run benefits include increased gains from trading prod-
ucts where countries have a comparative advantage;202 long-run benefits 
include greater specialization in response to the trade growth and, thus, 
augmented productivity and economies of scale.203 These immediate, 
short-run and long-run benefits will be applicable to both nations within 
a trading relationship, and as a result, the entire region itself would also 
experience mutual growth. One more benefit to trading within Latin 
America is that nations who engage in commerce are more apt to main-
tain peaceful relations because trade has made the nations “reciprocally 
 
 196. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2013 21 (2013), 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2013_e/its2013_e.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2014). 
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 198. WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL TRADE STATISTICS 2013, supra note 
196, at 21. 
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CONSULTANCY AFR. INTELLIGENCE (Nov. 16, 2012), 
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& Thomas J. Schoenbaum eds., 2013). 
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dependent” upon one another.204 
V. THE QUEST TO COMPLEMENT RATHER THAN SEGREGATE 
A. Expanding Pacific Alliance Membership 
Therefore, in order to mitigate the negative effects that may arise 
from unconfirmed perceptions and reap the benefits of intra-regional 
trade, the Pacific Alliance should permit other Latin American countries 
to join. In order to discuss the merits of this proposition, it is essential to 
become familiar with the current process of becoming a full member of 
the Pacific Alliance. Observer status nations to the Pacific Alliance are 
invited to work on strategic issues alongside members.205 While any 
country can obtain observer status,206 such nations are expected to agree 
with the principles and goals set forth in the Pacific Alliance’s Frame-
work Agreement.207 As of February 10, 2014, the Pacific Alliance has 
thirty observer states.208 To apply for membership, an observer must 
have bilateral free trade agreements with at least half of the Pacific Alli-
ance countries.209 There are four requirements to become a full member 
of the Pacific Alliance. The first and principal requirement is that the 
nation seeking membership must establish bilateral free trade agree-
ments with all other Pacific Alliance members.210 The second and third 
requirements are that nations drop tariffs (most, if not all of them) and 
 
 204. Rebossio, supra note 106; This idea is originally from Montesquieu, but its effects have 
been evident in a worldwide scale since increased globalization in the latter half of the twentieth 
century. Irwin, supra note 202, at 37. 
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 209. Schmidt & Doyle, supra note 37. 
 210. Lucien O. Chauvin, Regional Agreements: Pacific Alliance Hopes to Expand Regional 
Trade, Links With International Forums, BLOOMBERG BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY (Sept. 6, 2012), 
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eliminate visitor-visa requirements for citizens of the Pacific Alliance 
nations.211 The fourth and most questionable requirement is that the na-
tion seeking membership must possess a Pacific Ocean coastline.212 This 
last requirement will necessarily exclude various Latin American na-
tions. 
B. Coastline Contention 
While some countries such as Costa Rica, Panama and Guatemala 
can pursue membership due to their favorable geography, other nations 
such as Uruguay and Paraguay are, by definition, excluded from further 
integration with the Pacific Alliance despite their intentions.213 On May 
23, 2013, Costa Rica was invited to become a member at the VII Presi-
dential Summit in Cali, Colombia214 and is expected to officially join in 
2014.215 Panama, which already has free trade agreements with all the 
Pacific Alliance members,216 is in the process of meeting the other re-
quirements.217 Guatemala expressed an interest in becoming a member 
at the Cali Summit, but has not yet completed the requirement of free 
trade agreements with all four Pacific Alliance nations.218 
The argument that the Pacific Coastline limitation is beneficial be-
cause it controls the growth of the Pacific Alliance219 is not convincing. 
By already requiring each prospective member to have free trade 
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MAIL (May 20, 2013), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/canada-called-a-natural-
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 214. Schmidt & Doyle, supra note 37. 
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agreements with the existing members, it will take longer for each new 
member to obtain the required free trade agreements as the Pacific Alli-
ance membership expands. Thus, there is already a structural limitation 
in the rate of growth. Furthermore, the first three requirements would 
aid in the self-selection of like-minded, prospective members. The 
ubiquitous nature of these requirements would cause the prospective 
member to operate under the Pacific Alliance’s open regionalism mod-
el220 even before obtaining membership. Notably, the Pacific Ocean re-
quirement does not add to the benefit described above but rather, it 
functions as an absolute barrier to cooperation with Latin American na-
tions that otherwise match the mentality of the founding Pacific Alli-
ance members.221 
It seems uncharacteristic for an otherwise pragmatic Pacific Alli-
ance to make a vital distinction such as membership based on an arbi-
trary fact such as a particular coastline. A shared coastline requirement 
is also clearly not intended to maintain geographical proximity given 
that Tijuana (Mexico) is about as far from Punta Arenas (Chile) as Lon-
don is from Cape Town.222 Conversely, the only geographic requirement 
needed to become a member of the European Union is that the country 
be located in Europe.223 As evidenced by its fifty-seven years of main-
taining a common market among its members,224the European Union is 
a successful example of a stable yet growing trade integration, with its 
geographic requirement appropriately enhancing regional cohesion. A 
requirement that new members come from the same continent is effec-
tive because it ensures some geographic proximity and makes it more 
likely for member nations to communicate more effectively due to 
shared culture and history. As discussed in Part III, both of these char-
acteristics were considered to be factors for the success of a regional 
trade agreement, and conversely, the absence of these characteristics in 
 
 220. Open regionalism is based on the theory “that opening up to world trade would be more 
advantageous if combined with creating a deeper regional market, to reap economies of scale.” 
Latin American geoeconomics: A continental divide, supra note 65; Nolte & Wehner, supra note 
177, at 3.  
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37, at 4.  
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 223. Enlargement: Conditions for Membership, EUR. COMM’N, 
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26, 2014). 
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future members would make it more difficult to effectively integrate. 
Under the current requirements, Japan or Canada could join the Pacific 
Alliance and therefore the coastline requirement fails to promote geo-
graphic proximity and cultural similarity in new members. 
Like Costa Rica, Panama, and Guatemala, both Uruguay and Para-
guay had expressed intentions to join the Pacific Alliance as full mem-
bers.225 However, these nations currently have two limitations. First, un-
der Mercosur’s rules, Paraguay and Uruguay must obtain unanimous 
consent from the other Mercosur members to do so.226 This is unlikely to 
occur given the animosity and suspicion expressed by Mercosur mem-
bers against the Pacific Alliance. Second, neither Uruguay nor Paraguay 
could join the Pacific Alliance since Paraguay is landlocked and Uru-
guay only has access to the Atlantic Ocean.227 
Whereas Mercosur nations could over time change their opinion 
about the Pacific Alliance and consent to Uruguay’s request to become 
a Pacific Alliance member, the Pacific Alliance’s coastline requirement 
is fixed and unchanging. This prevents the possibility of Mercosur and 
the Pacific Alliance from working together in the long run. Moreover, 
this requirement has negative short-run effects: it may serve to exacer-
bate the already tenuous relationship between Mercosur and the Pacific 
Alliance, which was previously discussed above in Part IV. Not only 
does this requirement conclusively deprive Mercosur nations the oppor-
tunity to join the Pacific Alliance, but its rigidity may also prevent na-
tions without a Pacific Ocean coastline from conceiving a deeper inte-
gration with the Pacific Alliance. 
C. Maintaining Standards 
Therefore, the restriction limiting membership to countries with 
Pacific Ocean Coastlines should be lifted. Latin American nations 
should be allowed to join the Pacific Alliance if they wish, so long as 
the Pacific Alliance maintains its other standards for entry intact. It is 
critical that the Pacific Alliance not accept members who disagree with 
 
 225. Chauvin, Pacific Alliance Members Anticipate Creation of Trade Zone Similar to EU, 
supra note 213; Paraguay Becomes Observer of the Alliance of the Pacific, Despite Brazil and 
Mercosur, supra note 175. 
 226. Paraguay Becomes Observer of the Alliance of the Pacific, Despite Brazil and Mer-
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 227. This is in spite of the fact that Uruguay satisfies the condition of having free trade 
agreements with all four Pacific Alliance members. Paraguay Becomes Observer of the Alliance 
of the Pacific, Despite Brazil and Mercosur, supra note 175. 
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the Pacific Alliance’s values and objectives.228 Much of the success of 
the Pacific Alliance to date has been attributed to the similar mindset of 
the four founding nations.229 On June 17, 2013, a Bloomberg BNA arti-
cle evaluating the Pacific Alliance explained: “[w]hat makes the Pacific 
Alliance different? The member countries have demonstrated through 
existing policies that they share market and international economic out-
looks and goals.”230 
Mercosur’s admission of Venezuela illustrates the complications 
incurred by accepting a nation who does not uphold the original values 
of the group. The 1991 Treaty of Asunción, which established Mer-
cosur, was based upon “an ideology of open markets and free trade.”231 
And since its creation, the four founding members (Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay) had maintained these values.232 However, on 
July 31, 2012, Mercosur accepted Venezuela as a full member and in 
doing so deviated from its original principles.233 In addition to taking 
advantage of Paraguay’s suspension and thereby overlooking Para-
guay’s strong opposition to Venezuela’s entry, the remaining Mercosur 
members accommodated Venezuela’s entry by making an exception to 
Venezuela’s contrary position to Mercosur’s founding values.234 Vene-
zuela’s entry into Mercosur has placed a greater emphasis on increasing 
socio-political activities235 at the cost of neglecting the cultivation and 
expansion of their trade relations with other nations as initially intended. 
Another related concern for the Pacific Alliance is to avoid the 
temptation of expanding its objectives to include a political ideology. In 
the past, many regional trade agreements in Latin America have tended 
to neglect their trade relations over time in order to address social objec-
tives such as the unequal distribution of wealth. While their objective is 
honorable, the method is seldom effective because these reoriented trade 
agreements attract new members solely for political rather than econom-
 
 228. Dade & Meacham, supra note 152, at 11. “Core policies that create Pacific Alliance co-
hesiveness could erode if exceptions are made to accommodate new members.” Schmidt & 
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ic reasons.236 Unlike the founding members, who began with a similar 
economic outlook to establish the agreement, these new members may 
disagree on the economic operation of the agreement and cause discord-
ance among the existing members, which can ultimately reduce the ef-
fectiveness of the trade bloc. In contrast, the Pacific Alliance’s com-
mitment to be an “explicitly apolitical”237 trade agreement can enable 
these nations to focus exclusively on expanding their trade relations on 
a global level and kick start economic growth. Then, using a growing 
economy and increased GDP as a motor for reform, these nations can 
independently decide through their respective political process how to 
redirect wealth to alleviate inequality and address social concerns. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Pacific Alliance is close to achieving long-term economic 
success. Already possessing numerous common national characteristics, 
the Pacific Alliance nations have not had much difficulty cooperating in 
their shared goal of a free trade area accompanied by the free movement 
of factors of production. Also, the Pacific Alliance nations have had the 
foresight to implement policies that foster long-run economic growth, 
such as establishing a pathway of communication between the Alliance 
and private businesses and investing in public infrastructure. Nonethe-
less, maintaining a trade agreement is difficult, especially after the mo-
mentum wears off, and therefore requires strong institutions for deci-
sion-making and enforcement. This is why it is critical for the Pacific 
Alliance to construct a supranational entity whose decisions are binding 
and create an effective dispute resolution system. As a relatively new 
regional trade agreement, the Pacific Alliance still has time to establish 
these institutions. Its “early harvest” approach will also bring these na-
tions to confront these important topics in a timely manner. 
The predicted Pacific Alliance success will bring forth a distinct 
set of international concerns. Other Latin American nations have al-
ready expressed disapproval of the Pacific Alliance’s objectives and 
means. True or not, these negative perceptions are damaging to the Pa-
cific Alliance. It leads Latin American nations to view the Pacific Alli-
ance as an alternative to Mercosur and vice versa. This mentality leads 
to lost opportunities since it discourages Latin American nations from 
engaging in intra-regional trade, which could result in mutual economic 
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growth. 
Therefore, the Pacific Alliance needs to allow other nations to join. 
While it is wise to have requirements that encourage the inclusion of a 
new member with the same economic goals, the requirement that the 
nation possess a Pacific Ocean coastline is arbitrary at best, and at 
worst, prohibits neighboring Latin American nations from considering 
further integration. Even so, the Pacific Alliance must be careful in 
maintaining its substantive standards when it adds new members, lest 
the economic-based trade integration dissipate into a political forum. 
Despite the feelings of animosity from some Latin American nations, 
Uruguay’s attitude about the possibilities for the two trade blocs is ad-
mirable. Uruguayan Vice President Danilo Astori said that the member-
ship of the two groups is “not incompatible.”238 Hopefully this attitude, 
paired with the Pacific Alliance’s commitment to inclusiveness, can re-
sult in complementary growth and so enhance Latin American devel-
opment. 
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